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An old Danish saying goes: A word is a word. This is important, because social capital, 
defined as people’s ability to cooperate, may enhance economic growth in society. Why? Be-
cause a ‘social glue’ such as social capital, operationalized as the level of trust in a group, may 
reduce the number of transactions that must necessarily be enforced by a third-party. More 
transactions can take place at a lower cost, and trust will increase predictability and 
production in society. For example, it may be argued that voluntary organization among 
farmers lower transaction costs by having numerous informal transactions taking place which 
are not formally sanctioned. It is not necessary to monitor and enforce all the transactions. In 
this article we will use the Danish Cooperative Movement as an indicator of social capital 
because it is fully voluntary and as such reflects the level of trust and cooperation in rural 
society. 
We hypothesize that a group with members who trust each other can accomplish more eco-
nomic growth than a similar group without trust. As Putnam puts it: ‘Trust lubricates society’ 
(Putnam 1993b, p. 2). In this way, social capital is a new production factor which must be 
added to the conventional concepts of human and physical capital. Consequently, the concepts 
of social capital and trust are of extreme interest to social scientists.iii 
Therefore, the paper raises the following question: What principle can explain social capi-
tal, and how can it be built? In answering this question, Section 2 analyses the theoretical 
roots of social capital. Section 3 suggests different ways of measuring social capital. Section 4 
looks at empirical evidence from rural Denmark. Finally, the implications of the theoretical 
framework and the empirical indicators of social capital are described in Section 5. 
 
Social capital 
 
Tracing the theoretical roots of social capital raises a preliminary question: do we find a 
notion, in the social science literature, that can explain why people learn to trust each other 
and cooperate in the first place?  
Such a question leads us to the concept of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity is observed empirically by the perpetual exchanges of goods between the indi-
viduals and groups in every single community of a society, as was first shown by Mauss in a 
famous work, “The Gift”, first published in 1925.iv Mauss points out that it is precisely the 
reciprocity observed in the innumerable exchanges of goods in a society that - at an overall 
level - knits this society together in every aspect, producing common norms, common identity, 
trust and solidarity on the one hand, and strong economic ties on the other (Mauss 1969, p. 
70).v 
Reciprocity in the sense of ”the ability of people to work together for common purposes in 
groups and organizations” has recently been defined more specifically as 'social capital.' 
(Coleman 1988). Social capital is a more narrow definition of reciprocity which focuses on 
trust. Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, cooperative 
behaviour, based on commonly shared norms. Acceptable behaviour is disciplined by 
reinforcing encounters in a closed group. In this way, an informal agreement is accomplished 
where the only sanction is that of social ostracism.vi Therefore, a crucial issue would be to 
avoid the groups from growing bigger if these social pressures are to be maintained 
effectively.vii 
By extending Mauss’ argument further, we reach the conclusion that it is the demarcated, 
small scaled nature of the local communities that seems to stimulate the face-to-face 
exchanges which - according to Mauss - strengthen the socio-economic ties of the entire 
society. Reciprocal relations are being accumulated in bundles of local, social networks. 
Society’s cultural ‘fabrics’ are functioning. Social capital is being produced. In this way local, 
social networks create bottom-up social control, the order and social cohesion of the entire 
society is guaranteed in the sense that everybody is committed to everybody. As Mauss puts it, 
“Although the prestations and counter-prestations take place under a voluntary guise they are 
in essence strictly obligatory, and their sanction is private or open warfare” (Mauss 1969, p. 
3). In this way, Mauss actually provided a consistent explanation of Toennies’ Gemeinschaft 
and Durkheim’s “mechanical solidarity” - but not of the Gesellschaft and “organic solidarity”.  
Unlike Mauss who studied non-European pre-capitalist communities, later studies within 
sociology and anthropology have questioned the apparent equilibrium of a society’s produc-
tion of social capital. viii  Societies are, thus, being regarded as more fragile, often 
disharmonious, or even as collapsing. Social ties do not exist per se - they can be lost and 
must, therefore, continually be renewed. A society’s social capital must be built and protected. 
Whereas it takes a long time to build up a ‘stock’ of trust in society, it may be destroyed in a 
very short time. For example, Putnam (1996) shows in his article “The Strange Disappearance 
of Civic America” how a large stock of social capital in the USA, which culminated during 
the civil rights movements at the end of the sixties, rapidly eroded in the following decades. 
The prime cause, he argues, is TV, stealing people’s time and preventing them from taking 
part in civic engagements. 
 
Measurement 
 
Putnam (1993a) proposes a simple operational proxy: the density of voluntary 
organizations of any type. By comparing the North and the South of Italy, he concludes that 
the density of voluntary organizations is much higher in the North than in the South. This 
difference should then explain why economic performance is much higher in the North than in 
the South. 
Putnam states that the reason for this difference in density of voluntary organizations is the 
level of hierarchy. The North and South started on divergent paths back in the eleventh 
century when the South was subjected to a hierarchical Norman kingdom in 1100. This type 
of society reduces the amount of trust in leaders. Ordinary people and leaders are not 
interacting socially and do not build social capital. So the South experiences the Hobbesian 
outcome of amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic 
stagnation (Putnam 1993a). The solution would then be to scale down the role of hierarchical 
state intervention to avoid this "southern deadlock" and thereby leave room for horizontally 
structured voluntary organizations.ix 
Putnam (1993a, p. 167-170) lists different examples from different places all over the 
world that may indicate the presence of social capital. They can be divided into three 
categories: Farming communities, informal savings institutions and commons. 
First, there are numerous cases where farm tools are extensively borrowed and lent among 
farmers. This allows each farmer to get his work done with less physical capital. The tools are 
not stolen even when it is possible to steal without getting detected. As such, the Danish 
Cooperative Movement may be an indicator of social capital because it is fully voluntary. It 
was built between 1850 and 1900 and it created small local savings banks which were later 
followed by enterprises such as dairies, slaughterhouses and shops (Paldam and Svendsen 
1999). This is our main case in Section 4. 
Second, so-called rotating credit associations are found all over the world. They are made 
up of groups who agree to make regular contributions to a fund. Payments are then given, in 
whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation and this is helpful, for example, to finance a 
wedding, a bicycle, a sewing machine or a shop. The rotation continues until all members 
have had a turn at receiving the pot. Why shouldn't participants drop out once they have 
received the pot? Seeing that risk, why would anyone else contribute in the first place? 
Therefore, the system could not work unless all members kept paying voluntarily, trusting 
everybody else to keep paying. 
Third, there have been some cooperative attempts to manage common pool resources all 
over the world, as listed by Ostrom (1990). The most important ones are grazing grounds, 
water supplies and fisheries.  
In general, the three categories mentioned above are characterized by relatively small and 
closed groups with social pressure and face-to-face interaction. Small, close-knit communities 
with regular face-to-face interaction may establish trust and intimate familiarity.xSeveral empiri-
cal examples may be mentioned here. In Roumania, it is common that people take part in wide networks with 
manifold functions. Here friends, relatives and neighbours - more than having a mere social function - are sup-
posed to help each other with advice and services as well as acting as economic safeguard. In Roumania the rates 
of interest of private loans are extremely high - something which is clearly strengthening this tendency towards an 
informal economy. A case of the strength of ties of kinship, i.e. ‘strong ties’, can be found in Russian Karelia, 
where “networks of kinship and friends help many who are in the poorest situation, providing them with food, 
clothes and other necessities” (Kortelainen 1997, p. 33). Another example, recently studied, is the kinship based 
alliances in Kazachstan. These informal networks have experienced an enormous growth after the fall of the 
Soviet Union (see Odgaard and Simonsen 1998). 
 
The Danish cooperative dairy movement 
   
When measuring how social capital is built, we use Putnam’s approach and focus on 
participation in voluntary organizations, using as a case the establishment of a cooperative 
dairy movement in rural Denmark at the end of the 19th century. When explaining erosion of 
social capital, we focus on the declining number of cooperative dairies, which began at about 
1960 and escalated in the following decade. Because of this drastic reduction in the number of 
local dairies due to economies of scale, we hypothesize that this is the main reason why social 
capital is reduced. 
 
How is social capital built?  
 
During the last decades of the 18th century feudalism in Denmark was gradually wiped out 
by land reforms creating a whole new class of family farmers owning their own land. The 
struggle for a better life in the Danish countryside seemed to stagnate during an economic 
crisis in the 1870s. International corn prices slumped, and especially the small, corn 
producing, Danish farmers found themselves in a hopeless, economic situation (Bjoern 1982, 
p. 17-19). 
Generally, the shift to exporting secondary agricultural produce instead of grain due to the 
new demands of the world market led to an increase in the production of animal produce. But 
in 1879 Germany imposed a duty on all living cattle coming from Denmark, and the export of 
cattle was halved the following year (Bjoern 1982, p. 48). The loss of the German market gave 
rise to the so-called home dairies, where neighbours collaborated in the production of butter. 
Inspired by the English Cooperative movement back in the early 1840sxi farmers in 
Hjedding near Varde in the Western part of Denmark developed the concept of home dairy 
into that of a cooperative dairy. Their dairy, which was founded in 1882, was to become the 
ideal model to be imitated all over the country during the subsequent decades. So it happened 
that  
 after a period of only 10 years, one third of all Danish farms delivered milk to one of the about 
700 cooperative dairies, andelsmejerier, spread all over the country (Bjoern 1982, p. 112).
 This development took place in spite of the Danish government. Until the end of the de-
cade, the Danish government - being conservative and anti-socialist - did nothing to encourage 
the foundation of cooperative dairies. In fact, both the state and the agricultural organizations 
were often “downright negative” in their relation to the dairies (Bjoern 1982, p. 80). But the 
movement was out of their control. The rural population joined voluntarily and the Figure 1: 
Number of Danish cooperative dairies 1882-1890. 
Source: Bjoern 1982, p. 85.  
 
number of cooperative dairies increased rapidly. Voluntarily, people spent their own money as 
start capital, raised loans in their own local financial institutesxii, themselves asking - and pay-
ing - for technical advice and so on. In short, they managed to do so despite the state, using 
their own resources.xiii 
These resources, scarce though they seem in the Danish countryside in the beginning of the 
1880s, sprang out of mutual confidence and mutual trust between members of the local soci-
ety. To know each other well was clearly a precondition for people joining in any shared, eco-
nomic adventure, especially such a risky one. 
Because the number of participants of a cooperative dairy was limited by the small size of the local area, one 
may presume that these people knew each other very well, and the joint and several liability, therefore, seem 
to have been the appropriate way to resolve common, economic tasks (translated from Bjoern 1982, p. 96). 
 
But why did all these people engage in such activities? What purposes and interests did 
they share? And what common goods did they achieve? 
Apart from people knowing and trusting each other, a precondition for the success of the 
cooperative dairy was common economic interest, promoted in the four standard paragraphs 
of the articles of such an organization (see Roerdam 1983, p. 27-34). 
First, the idea of open membership was to invite everybody to join the local andelsmejeri, 
regardless of either political/religious conviction or economic ability.  
Second, this was supplemented by democratic decision making. Thus the owners voted 
“due to heads and not due to cows” as the saying went. Everybody, high and low, was equal.xiv  
Third, people shared the economic responsibility for their dairy, supplying start capital, all 
 
bearing the responsibility of loans for buildings, equipment, etc. Thus, people were jointly and 
severally liable for the risks of loss and were, therefore, also forced to cooperate in spite of 
political, religious or social conflicts - a most crucial detail.xv 
Fourth, the profit was not shared in a socialist way: it was paid back to the members in 
proportion to the amount of milk delivered by each individual during a certain period of time.  
In this way the democratic, socio-economic elements - at that time by some interpreted as 
“socialist influence” - were outweighed by the profit making part of the whole business. The 
members actually earned money! Rationalizations and the use of new technologies and 
professionalization increased the total profit from 20 to 25% on average, compared to the 
home dairies (Bjoern 1982, p. 116). 
We see that strong common, economic impulses, mediating political, religious and social 
differences, first of all constitute the core of this kind of cooperation. People in the Danish 
countryside simply became richer and richer during this period in spite of  the international 
economic crisis.xvi 
As we have already shown in the Danish case economic profit as well as democracy and 
trust appear to be crucial in the process of social capital building. They lead to the formation 
of social capital, to its ‘cytogenesis’ so to speak.  
But building social capital involves another step: the spread of socio-economic networks or 
‘mytosis’. How was the idea and practice of cooperative dairies to be spread out to the entire 
country? In order to understand this we have to supplement the three core elements - profit, 
democracy, and trust - with that of entrepreneurship. Most important, the entrepreneurs had to 
be reliable. The element of entrepreneurship is, thus, closely connected to the element of trust. 
At a micro level, the single local entrepreneur had to be regarded as a ‘most trustworthy’ 
man in every aspect, if he was to succeed with his dairy project. The choice would fall on the 
local school teacher, known by everybody, on a respected and well-to-do farmer or on a dairy 
technical autodidact, who had already proven his worth by contributing to the foundation of 
several dairies in other parts of the country. In short, the members wanted their leaders to be 
“experienced men, inspiring confidence, whose participation was found to be valuable or even 
necessary for the foundation of the dairy” (translated from Bjoern 1982, p. 104). 
The local school teacher, especially active in the first years, only seldom acted on the basis 
of pure philanthropic, say, socialist motives. He wanted to profit economically. Normally, the 
community gave him a small piece of land, a so-called “schoolacre”. In order to supplement 
poor wages and thereby be able to provide for an often very numerous family he had to culti-
vate this piece of land skilfully. This intensive form of horticulture furthermore involved the 
raising of domestic animals, including cows. So we understand that the school teacher himself 
acted as milk supplier, enlarging a source of income of his, not to speak of the earnings in 
connection with the writing of association articles for the society, contributing with technical 
devices (Bjoern 1982, p. 108). 
The well-to-do farmer, who more and more tended to take over the role as entrepreneur, 
had a special economic interest in the local dairy. First of all he had a lot of cows and was, 
therefore, able to increase his profit more. But often he was simply ‘head hunted’ by smaller 
entrepreneurs with less social, political and economic prestige, because only he could act as 
the trustworthy man needed, often with the power to gain access to the local savings bank and 
exercise major influence on the bank’s board of directors.  
This kind of head hunting was soon to become common practice at the meso level - that is, 
at a level where groups of entrepreneurs communicate and cooperate. So we see that all these 
local consultants, experts, most trustworthy men were invited to different corners of the coun-
try to talk about the revolutionary innovation, andelsmejeriet, the great majority of them pro-
posing strictly economic arguments (Bjoern 1982, p. 72). Moreover, after the talk these men 
were often invited to participate in the foundation of a new dairy in the local areas in question 
because of their former engagements, known by all to be successful. So, from functioning 
solely as single, local entrepreneurs, they joined into entrepreneurial groups at the regional 
level, thus enlarging the common good of their activity to include extra-local communities. 
The entrepreneurs, facilitating local cooperation, trust and economic growth at a local, mi-
cro level with a regional, meso level, were soon also to facilitate this particular stock of social 
capital with a national, macro level.   
Social capital spreading to a national level, then, first of all had the result that the coopera-
tive idea was promoted and a lot of dairies were built. Second, that the foundation of a dairy 
followed exactly the same pattern no matter in which part of the country it took place (Bjoern 
1982, p. 72). And third, but not least important: that promotion and agitation transformed into 
communication.  
A common national interest was created, as well as a debate.  
So it happened that towards the end of the 1880s newspapers and agricultural magazines, 
formerly ignoring the matter, began to show interest, now criticising, now defending the 
model. Educational institutions became an intermediary of the cooperational idea - and in 
1889 even the government finally decided to recognize the movement by offering the 
cooperative dairies free technical support (Bjoern 1982, p. 80). 
By means of entrepreneurship the Danish Cooperative Dairy Movement, 
andelsmejeribevaegelsen, thus went through the ‘mytosis’ proces. The model of cooperation 
embedded in a specific local network was exported to other localities and even to other coun-
tries.xvii The communication net gradually extended. Interregional relations based on mutual 
trust were created, almost physically knitting rural Denmark together by strong socio-eco-
nomic ties. Social capital was built, not only to the profit of the individual, local community 
but also to the profit of the whole nation. 
We have now seen that the process of social capital building in rural Denmark in the first 
place was caused by economic impulses in connection with two other elements, democracy 
and trust. This constitutes the initial part of the process, the ‘cytogenesis’ of social capital. 
This is followed by the second part of the process, the spreading out of networks or ‘mytosis’ 
through entrepreneurial agitation, promotion and exportation of a specific model of 
organization. 
Such complexity is also noted by Putnam (1993b, p. 3), who in an article concerning de-
mocracy remarks that “those who have social capital tend to accumulate more”. “Stocks of 
social capital”, i.e. the civic traditions of a society defined as its, through history, accumulated 
sum of trust, norms, and networks, thus form the basis of further accumulation of social 
capital (Putnam 1993b, p. 3). 
In our Danish case it is hard to say whether it was ‘civic traditions’ that generated the revo-
lution, and the following evolution. It might be - and it might not.xviii It is beyond doubt, 
though, that once the organizational model had been established, it formed an almost physical, 
socio-economic structure, apt to not only satisfy pure economic purposes, but also economic, 
social as well as purely personal purposes which is well documented in current investigations 
on the subject.xix  
In this way the Danish Cooperative Movement, Andelsbevaegelsen, should be regarded as a 
socio-economic phenomenon, whose social and economic factors are inextricably woven to-
gether. Here, we witness a specific cooperative ‘spirit’ or Weltanschauung allowing neigh-
bours, tied together by strong socio-economic relations of trust, to communicate, visit each 
other, exchange services, help each other. In short: to participate in each others lives.  
 
How does social capital erode? 
 The amount of social capital, which was built and institutionalized in the Danish country-
side from the early 1880s and through the first half of the 20th century seems to stagnate and 
erode during the 1960s. It took 80 years to build up this public good but only 15-20 years to 
destroy it. 
Like in other Western countries a large scaled rationalization beginning in the 1950s took 
place in Danish agriculture due to international, economic pressure. This rationalization was 
of a technological nature and had widespread cultural impact on life in the Danish 
countryside. So it happened that during this period about 250 000 left their agricultural 
occupations, the greater part of them seeking new jobs in the nearby cities or towns. This can 
be paralleled with the rapid decline in the number of farms from about 200 000 in 1960 to 
about 70 000 in the mid 1990s (Bjoern 1997, p. 309). 
This development was to hit the Danish Cooperative Movement especially hard. In the 
beginning of the 1930s there were about 1700 dairies, but they were reduced to less than 20 in 
1997. All these local enterprises were closed on the basis of economic arguments. And, evi-
dently, this did not hinder an immense increase in productivity as is shown in the diagram.  
In this way, economies of scale and competition led to the shut-down of local dairies and 
the centralization of dairy production. More efficient dairy production leads, on its own, to 
more economic growth. However, one must deduct the loss in social capital, and it is not clear 
whether the net gain is positive in this case. Perhaps a modernized, decentralized system 
would have managed just as well - and maybe better in the long run?xx 
 
Figure 2: Number of dairies and production of milk. 1882-1981. 
The curve to the left shows the number of cooperative dairies 1882-1981. 
The curve to the right shows the production of milk..        
Source: Roerdam 1983, p. 94. 
 
Putting the national economic question aside, we see that the development - including the 
‘sacrificing’ of local dairies - was experienced as nothing less than a disaster by the rural Dan-
ish population, as widely documented by ethnological fieldwork. In the beginning of the 
1970s an ethnological study was made of a Danish colony of husmaend, smallholders, called 
the Roenhave colony on the island of Als (off the coast of the Southern part of the peninsula 
Jutland). Here, the formation of social capital in a local farming community is evident. 
 
The smallholders had the same opinions and evaluated things in the same way. From the foundation [in 1925] 
to about 1950 the colony formed a relatively stable and homogeneous, local community (..) The smallholders 
were united by economic and cooperative ties in a pattern of social relations which constituted a small-mesh-
ed network” (translated from Solvang 1997, p. 68).  
 
From 1950 cultural changes gradually set in. Conflicts between generations of smallholders 
due to the technological revolutions of the occupation resulted in the initial disintegration of 
 
the “patterns of network” within the community (Solvang 1997, p. 68). 
Later research from the beginning of the 1990s, undertaken by the same ethnologist at the 
same location, shows that the total structural changes in Danish agriculture which took place 
in the period 1962-75 led to a total disintegration of the Roenhave community as an 
agricultural community within the cooperative movement context.  
In the course of these years the erosion of social capital was completed.  
However, in the 1980s and 1990s it seems as if a stock of social capital was being built 
again - but a totally new one, dominated by the new socio-economic groups, who moved into 
the houses, which were formerly smallholding farms (Solvang 1997, pp. 81-83). The ‘glue’ of 
the new networks being created is seen in the “mutual human relations” and not so much in 
the cooperative “working relations”, which had totally dominated the smallholding 
community until 1950 (Solvang 1997, p. 83).  
An investigation of four Danish villages (Christiansen 1980) tells us that only those com-
munities which succeeded in maintaining common village activities - formal as well as infor-
mal - were able to survive the ‘cold years’ from 1960 to the mid 1970s (Christiansen 1980, p. 
326). The collapse of the old way of living is described by the same ethnologist in a book with 
the significant title: “A life form on forced sale?” - referring to a dying rural culture (Chris-
tiansen 1982). 
But also in these fieldwork studies we witness that something new is happening. Other 
people, not belonging to an old agricultural tradition, are voluntarily moving into the empty 
houses left by former farmers, thus facing the problems of transport, slender occupational 
chances and insufficient public service.  
Can this be interpreted as the beginning of a new cycle of social capital building, a new 
‘round’ so to speak? - the rise of a specific, time and place bound stock of social capital in 
rural Denmark, in which the social dimension of the relations seems to be more important 
than the economic dimension of the relations. If this is the case, we have to reject Putnam 
when he talks about a nation’s stock of social capital in pure historical terms, arguing that the 
accumulated civic traditions should form the basis for further accumulation of social capital. 
Taking the case of rural Denmark, it certainly is possible to argue that the stock of social 
capital, which was formed at the end of the 19th century, was based on the preceding, civic 
traditions, but this argument simply will not do when we are speaking about the stock of 
social capital that has been built gradually since the1970s. In this case the ‘old’ stock of social 
capital seems to have been lost once and for all, which shows the context-dependent nature of 
social capital. Do stocks of social capital, then, have limited lifetimes, though of varying 
duration? Can we prolong their lives at all? Can trust possibly be transferred from one period 
of time to another? Only by further investigations can such questions be answered. 
 
Implications 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the old saying ‘a word is a word’ used to be valid in the 
Danish country side but that the level of trust decreased when dairy production was central-
ized. In this way, the article suggests that social capital, in the sense of trust, was built when 
the voluntary Danish Cooperative Dairy Movement was established at the end of the last cen-
tury, leading to cooperation and economic growth in rural Denmark, despite international, 
economic crisis. 
However, this former, rich peasant community life seems to have collapsed gradually when 
small, local dairies were shut down. Thus, we draw attention to the fact that any loss in social 
capital must be deducted from the economic gain following economies of scale (centralization 
of dairy production). We suggest that alternative possibilities should be considered further, 
taking social capital into account, because it is uncertain whether the net gain is positive or 
whether another way of organizing production - and maintaining the high level of social capi-
tal established during the Danish Cooperative Dairy Movement - would significantly have 
increased economic growth further. 
Because the only sanction mechanism in voluntary groups is that of social ostracism, the 
setting for these effective social sanction mechanisms must be maintained. It is important to 
prevent voluntary closed groups, beneficial to economic growth, from turning into harmful 
rent-seeking groups. As such, these voluntary groups should not be formally institutionalized 
and the sizes of such well-functioning voluntary groups should not be increased. Otherwise, 
the disciplining effect of repeated face-to-face interaction will be reduced. So will trust among 
people when they are repeatedly exposed to free-rider behaviour and the avoidance of paying 
for the informal establishment of collective goods. 
How was social capital built and how did it erode? 
First of all, we found that the initial establishment of networks - the ‘cytogenesis’ of social 
capital - is contingent upon the existence of the three key elements: democracy, trust and the 
equal possibility of making profit. Second, that the spread of networks - or the ‘mytosis’ of 
social capital - is contingent upon entrepreneurship on a regional and national level.  
These two stages in the cycle form what we have termed the building of social capital. The 
common goods achieved in this way consisted of a significant increase in productivity from 
the beginning of the 1880s. This happened in a broader context of increased communication 
between people, at a local, regional and national level, in spite of international economic 
crises and the governmental scepticism towards the cooperative dairies. 
Third, the story showed us that centralization and monopolization of production activities 
seem to weaken the communication, thus leading to the last stage of the process or what we 
called the erosion of social capital.  
So, during the last decades, the democratic elements of the cooperative model - open mem-
bership, democratic decision making, shared economic responsibility - seem to have slipped 
away. Shared responsibility and mutual trust between people are reduced to pure economic 
obligations between the individual producer and the monopoly-like organization. In this way, 
from about 1960, social capital has been hollowed and the networks, formerly serving a multi-
tude of functions, have imperceptibly vanished, as documented in the ethnological investiga-
tions. However, a new stock of social capital seems to be built in rural Denmark in these 
years, primarily under the influence of the newcomers who are increasingly dominating the 
former peasant communities. Unlike the stock that was built in the 19th century and was 
characterized by cooperative working relations, this one seems to be characterized by mutual 
human relations. In this way, we witness the emergence of a completely new ‘cycle’ of social 
capital within the context of a new historical era - a stock of social capital, which we may 
presume will develop through the stages of cytogenesis, mytosis and erosion. However, 
instead of ending up with a purely mechanistic view of the nature of social capital, we will 
point out the possibility of, actively, enhancing trust and cooperation in society. In other 
words, the complexity of socio-economic relations in a society, summed in Mauss’ notion of 
reciprocity, must, where economically feasible, be protected from disintegration. 
Thus, we conclude that formalized economic relations must not be isolated from the infor-
mal, social relations between people belonging to the same local community. Social capital 
must be added as an important production factor when considering economic growth and the 
net outcome of any economic solution such as economies of scale and centralization of pro-
duction. 
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under the cross disciplinary research initiative, “The Agrarian Landscape in Denmark 
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Martin Paldam, Peter Nannestad, Per Grau Moeller, Karen Katharina Elberg, Ann-Marie 
Gabel and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.  
ii.Gunnar L.H. Svendsen is a PhD student at The Danish Institute of Border Region Studies, 
Aabenraa. GS@ifg.dk. 
 
iii.The ongoing World Bank project on social capital analyses these concepts and tries to 
measure it in different ways. See World Bank (1999). 
iv.This is shown in the Potlatch case among the Northwest coast Indians and in the case of the 
‘Kula’ among the Trobriands (Mauss 1969). 
v. Portes and Sensenbrenner point at Simmel as the source for “reciprocity transactions” 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner in Flora, 1998).  
vi. The social norms can be based on religious or justice values but they also cover secular 
norms like professional standards and codes of behavior. These norms are created and 
transmitted through cultural mechanisms. The word 'culture' itself suggests that the ethical 
rules by which people live are nurtured through repetition, tradition, and example. Therefore, 
human beings will never behave as purely selfish utility maximizers as postulated by 
economists. See Granovetter (1985) for a critique of neoclassical economy. See Svendsen, 
G.T. (1998) concerning economic rationality and Svendsen, G.T. (1999) concerning profit 
maximization and altruism among US environmental groups. See also Green and Shapiro 
(1994), Fukuyama (1995a, b), Becker (1968, 1996) and Olson (1982, 1993, 1996). 
vii. Large, open and more complex settings would require a more impersonal or indirect form 
of trust. More complex networks of mutual trust must be woven together. Often, members 
must trust in the trust of others. Here, social networks may allow trust to become transitive 
and spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you. See Sandefur 
and Laumann (1998) concerning Coleman’s concept of social capital. See Portes (1998) and 
Flora (1998) for a review of the origins of the concept of social capital.  
viii.Durkheim struggled to understand the problem  in “Suicide” (1963 [1897]), using case 
studies from Western Europe. Within anthropology, conflict theory was introduced by the 
marxist influenced Max Gluckman, using case studies from South Africa (Gluckman 1958). 
ix. At a general level Boix and Posner argue that it is a society’s “deep-rooted social 
inequality” that blocks the building of social capital, a crucial point that is ‘almost invisible’ 
in Putnam’s account of Italian history as well as in other accounts of ‘the evolution of social 
co-operation’ (Boix and Posner 1998, p. 689). 
x . Recent sociological research shows that both kinship relations (‘strong ties’) and 
non-kinship relations, i.e. friends, connections etc. (‘weak ties’), are important elements in the 
building of social capital (Granovetter 1973). The strong ties are necessary for the internal 
solidarity within the community; the weak ties lead to linkages to extra-community networks 
                                                                             
(Flora 1998, p. 483). See also Hofferth And Iceland (1998).  
 
xi.In 1843 some weavers in Rochdale near Manchester opened a cooperative wholesale society, 
owned by the members themselves. The first cooperative wholesale society in Denmark was 
founded in 1866. 
 
xii.The investments were first of all financed by the local savings banks. In this way “the main 
part of the capital invested in the dairies 1882-90 comes from the savings of the agriculture 
itself” (translated from Bjoern 1982, p. 100). See also Paldam and Svendsen, G.T. (1999). 
xiii.“The cooperative dairies were not a result of a central administration. From their foundation 
they were formed by the local population and the conditions of the locality” (translated from 
Bjoern 1982, p. 119). 
xiv.With the exception of 10-15 % of all the cooperative dairies, which voted ‘due to cows and 
not due to heads’ (Bjoern 1982, p. 95).  
xv.The newspaper, Fyens Tidende, wrote in May 1888 in connection with the foundation of 
dairies near the city of Ringe: “former political opponents - foes, one could even say - went 
hand in hand in the most perfect agreement and concord” (translated from Bjoern 1982, p. 
115. See also pp. 95-96).  
xvi.The total production of the Danish agriculture increased from 305 million DKK in 1870 to 
897 million in 1913. The export of butter increased from 12.5 million kg. in 1880 to about 90 
million kg. in the beginning of the new century, and the export of milk increased from 200 
litres to about 600 000 litres in the same period (Bjoern 1982, pp.  21, 552 and 561).  
xvii .The Danish Cooperative Movement have strongly influenced similar movements in 
Norway and Sweden. 
xviii.There is no doubt that the earlier mentioned land reforms created the “structural frame” for 
the development (Bjoern 1988, p. 368). Also important for the movement were the Danish 
folkehoejskoler, folk high schools, since the 1840s important channels for the spread of 
knowledge to the rural population. See also Korsgaard 1997 for a more detailed analysis.  
xix. E.g., this suggestion is confirmed by a recent fieldwork study from the countryside of the 
Western part of the Danish island Funen (Elberg 1999). An interesting detail is revealed in an 
interview with a fisherman’s wife. Here, the woman recalls the old fellowship with the other 
women of the community, culminating in the collective purchase of a washing machine back 
in 1945 (Elberg 1999, chapt. 5). But the idea that the whole population of the village 
necessarily and logically should be tied together by common interests as the newcomers 
imagine it, is a totally foreign thought to her and the other elderly inhabitants of the 
community (Elberg 1999, chapt. 5). The exchange between the newcomers is of a formal kind 
of nature. In other words, they reciprocate because they think it rational to do so. Like the 
newcomers, the ‘indigenous’ inhabitants also meet in a formal way in different societies, but - 
more important as it seems - they also meet privately after the meetings to discuss and chat. 
Unlike the newcomers, they form both formal and informal socio-economic networks (Elberg 
1999, chapt. 5).  
xx. Fruitless as they seem, such questions seem relevant in the Danish context. For the time 
being the Danish cooperative group of dairies, “MD foods”, is monopolizing the home 
                                                                             
market. Taking the risk of being accused of nostalgia, we doubt that this development will 
further the general interests of the nation. 
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